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Double Perfection Rule for Security
Assignments of True Leases
In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., decided by the Second Circuit in
1973, is a case of first impression involving assignments of equipment
leases under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Equipment
lease financing typically involves two transactions: 3 (1) the lessor signs
a lease with a lessee; and (2) the lessor assigns a security interest4 in
the right to receive rental payments and in the right to repossess the
leased equipment as collateral for a loan from a third party financer.
Under the Code, the secured transactions aspects of the first step can
follow an established pre-Code pattern. 5 But since the equipment lease
has only recently become a major commercial financing device," the
relevant Code provisions were drafted without particular attention to
1. 351 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), remanded for evidentiary hearing, 486 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1973). Accord, Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank, 368 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (litigation involving same parties, but different lease).
2. Hereinafter cited as the UCC or the Code or by section number only. Unless other-
wise indicated, all references are to both the 1962 and 1972 versions of the Code. In
both New York and New Jersey (the states involved in Leasing Consultants), as well as
in 37 other states, the 1962 version is still in force. Some 12 states have enacted the
1972 version of the Code. Only Louisiana has not enacted the Code at all. UCC RE!'.
SERv., art. 9, app. at 2 (1975); 4 CCH SEC. TRANS., Installment Credit Guide, No. 162,
at 1 (1975) (Kansas).
3. See generally sources cited in note 6 infra.
4. A security interest is "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation." § 1-201(37).
5. See Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security De-
vices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 936.
6. See Shapiro, The ABC's of Leasing, in EQUipNIENT LEASING IN TIuE 1970's 11 (S.
Shapiro & A. Reisman eds. PLI Commercial Ser. No. 95, 1973); Weiss & McGugan, The
Equipment Leasing Industry and the Emerging Role of Banking Organizations, NEW
ENG. EcoN. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 3. This n'ew development is motivated primarily
by the tax advantages of the equipment leasing transaction. Under provisions of the fed-
eral income tax laws effective in 1962, a corporation which purchases certain types of
depreciable equipment can obtain a tax credit for the year of purchase. INT. REV. CoDE
oF 1954, §§ 38-48. However, a corporation cannot use these credits to reduce its tax lia-
bility by more than 50 percent in one year. As a result,
many corporations have adopted lease financing to, in effect, split the benefits of
that portion of the investment credit (and depreciation deductions) which they can-
not otherwise use to the maximum benefit with an earnings rich corporation or a
group of high tax bracket individuals, generally referred to as the equity owners,
willing to acquire the necessary capital equipment and lease it to the corporation
at a rental set below the normal rate to reflect the tax benefits obtained by the
equity owners.
Riordan & Duffy, Lease Financing: A Discussion of Security and Other Considerations
from the Institutional Lenders' Point of View, 24 Bus. LAw. 763 (1969).
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the problems involved at the subsequent assignment step.7 Faced with a
novel problem at this step, the Second Circuit in Leasing Consultants
imposed differing burdens on a financing assignee seeking to protect
its interest in the leased equipment, depending on whether the under-
lying agreement is characterized as a "true lease" or a "security lease."
The court's approach should be rejected.
I. The Problem: Perfection of Security Interests
in Equipment Lease Financing
A. The Lessor-Lessee Relationship: True Leases
and Security Leases
In § 1-201(37), the Code recognizes two theoretically distinct types
of agreements written in lease form-true leases and security leases.
8
The true lease is what is commonly meant by the word "lease." In
theory, the lessor allows the lessee to use the equipment for some
fraction of its useful life, but "fully expects to retake the chattel at
the end of the lease term and either resell or re-lease it." The right
to possession of the equipment upon default or expiration of the lease
may be termed the "equipment reversion."' 0
The security lease may be thought of as a "disguised" security agree-
ment," a secured installment sales contract,' 2 or a lease "intended as
security."' 3 Although the security leasing agreement is written in lease
form, the security lessor does not expect to retake the goods at the
end of the lease period but instead to transfer full ownership to the
"lessee" for a minimal sum.1 4 For this reason, the Code treats security
leases as security agreements, giving the "lessor" a security interest in
the "leased" property.
Under the Code, the holder of a security interest must generally
7. Professor Gilmore, one of the Code's chief draftsmen, has written that "the new-
fangled equipment leases did not come under judicial scrutiny before the widespread
enactment of Article 9 of the Code." I G. GILMORE, SEcuRITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 3.6, at 81 [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
8. See generally J. WHInTE & R. Submmxts, THE UNIFORMf COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-3
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERs]. For the origins of the distinction between
true and security leases, see p. 1731 infra.
9. Comment, Equipment Leasing Under the UCC, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 125, 134 (1965).
10. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF'PROPERTY §§ 154-55 (1936).
11. A security agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest ...." § 9-105(l)(h) (1962 version); § 9-105(l)(l) (1972 version). For the definition
of a security interest, see note 4 supra.
12. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 22-3, at 762.
13. § 1-201(37).
14. Clark, Bankers Guide to UCC Filing Problems-Loans for Equipment Leasing, 92
BANKINO L.J. 222, 224-26 (1975). Under a typical security agreement, the debtor acquires
full ownership as soon as the required payments are completed.
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protect or "perfect" 15 the interest against third parties by filing in the
appropriate recordkeeping office." The purpose of this filing is to
give notice of the security interest to third parties who might other-
wise deal with the grantor of the security interest in the mistaken be-
lief that the grantor owned the collateral outright rather than subject
to the security interest.' An unfiled or unperfected security interest,
including one created by a security lease, is voidable by the debtor's
trustee in bankruptcy.'8 A true lease does not create a security interest
and hence is not subject to filing requirements; the true lessor may
repossess the equipment upon default or expiration of the lease with-
out fear of losing the equipment to the lessee's trustee in bankruptcy.1 9
15. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 23-5, at 796:
Perfection is a term of art in Article Nine . . . .The legal consequences of per-
fection are considerable. Indeed, the perfected secured creditor is nearly as far above
the unperfected secured creditor on the pecking order as the unperfected secured
creditor is above the general creditor.
16. Id. at 796-97:
By far the most common and most important method of perfection of a security in-
terest under Article Nine is the filing of a financing statement . . . . A second
method of perfection which may be used with respect to certain kinds of collateral
[e.g., goods, id. § 23-10; UCC § 9-305] and which must be used with respect to some
kinds of collateral [e.g., negotiable instruments, WHITE & SUMMERS § 23-10, at 815;
UCC § 9-304(l)] is creditor possession of the collateral-the pledge. Finally, some
security interests [e.g., in consumer goods, WHITE & SUMMERS § 23-5, at 797; UCC
§ 9-302(l)(d)] are automatically perfected under the Code at the time of their creation
and without the performance of any additional act by the secured creditor.
This Note assumes that only one filing in a jurisdiction is sufficient to perfect a security
interest. Multiple filings may in fact be required by state law. See Clark, supra note 14,
at 243. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, §§ 23-11, -12.
17. WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 7, § 23-5, at 796-97:
[A] financing statement is a simple notice which contains only enough information
to notify a reader that the creditor named claims an interest in certain categories
of collateral belonging to the debtor named. The financing statement is not often
the operative document which created the security interest between the parties but
is merely a publicly filed notice which tells a reader where to hunt for more
information.
See generally Levin, The Intention Fallacy in the Construction of Title Retaining Con-
tracts, 24 MICH. L. REv. 180, 131-43 (1925).
18. § 9-301(l)(b), (3); see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 23-5, at 796:
The most crucial legal consequence of perfection is the priority it earns the secured
party over a subsequent lien creditor. Of course, the lien creditor par excellence is
the trustee in bankruptcy wielding his section 70(c) rights [of priority over unper-
fected security interests, id. § 24-31]. Thus a secured party who perfects prior to
bankruptcy is likely to have the right to snatch the collateral out of the trustee's
hands, but an unperfected secured party will invariably have to eat from the general
creditors' trough in bankruptcy.
A typical case is In re Oak Manufacturing, Inc., 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), in which a referee in bankruptcy held that an agreement which was written in
lease form was actually a security lease and that the lessor had only a security interest
in the leased goods. Because the lessor had failed to perfect its interest by filing, the
interest was held to be void against the lessee's trustee in bankruptcy.
An unperfected security interest is also subordinate to the rights of certain other
lien creditors, § 9-301(l), and purchasers, § 9-307; however, the trustee in bankruptcy is
the only competitor of the lessor or lessor's assignee with which this Note is concerned.
19. Article 9 permits the filing of true leases to protect the lessor if the document
is subsequently shown to be a security lease. § 9-408 (1972 version). See Coogan, The
New UCC Article 9, in COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC,
1 UCC Serv. § 3A.05[2] (1974).
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B. The Lessor-Assignee Relationship: The Assignee's
Security Interests in the Rental Payments
and the Equipment Reversion
Whether the lessor has a security interest in or a reversionary right
to the equipment, that is, whether the lease is a security lease or true
lease, the lessor commonly assigns to a financing assignee security
interests both in the right to receive rental payments from the lessee
and in the rights in the equipment. At this point, the assignee of the
true or security lessor must perfect its security interests against the
lessor for the same reason that the lessor must perfect its interest against
a lessee under a security lease. 20 Otherwise, the assignee's interests
may be avoided by the lessor's trustee in bankruptcy. It is with the
perfection rules applicable to the lessors' assignees that Leasing Con-
sultants is concerned.
C. The Double Perfection Rule of In re
Leasing Consultants, Inc.
Leasing Consultants, Inc. (Leasing), a New York corporation, en-
tered into eight leases of equipment with Plastimetrix, Inc. (Plasti-
metrix), a New Jersey corporation. The equipment was kept in the
Plastimetrix plant in New Jersey. 2I Leasing then assigned a security
interest in the leases and the leased equipment to First National City
Bank (FNCB). FNCB took possession of the leases and filed financing
statements against Leasing in New York, but did not file against
Leasing at the situs of the equipment in New Jersey.2 2 Six months
later, Leasing and then Plastimetrix entered bankruptcy. FNCB and
Leasing's trustee in bankruptcy began litigation over the proceeds of
the sale of the leased equipment surrendered by Plastimetrix.23
Because of a stipulation between the parties, the district court as-
sumed that the Leasing-Plastimetrix agreements were true leases rather
than security leases. 24 The district court stated that as a true lessor,
Leasing had two interests in its transactions with Plastimetrix. Leas-
20. See pp. 1723-24 supra.
21. Leasing filed financing statements against PlastimetrLx in New Jersey; the filings
purported to be "for informational purposes only," because the leases were allegedly
true leases. 351 F. Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 369.
22. 351 F. Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 369.
23. 351 F. Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 370.
24. The parties had stipulated that "[a]t all times relevant hereto, [Leasing] owned
the leased equipment, subject to the claims and interests of the Bank .... 351 F. Supp.
at 1392; 486 F.2d at 372. The district court used the term "conditional sales agreement"
instead of "security lease" but the two are treated equivalently under the Code. See
Coogan, supra note 5, at 973. (A conditional sales contract is a device by which the vendor
sells goods but retains title as security. See id. at 937.)
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ing's right to receive rental payments was embodied in the leases.
Since FNCB had possessed and filed against the leases in New York,
the bank's security interest in the rental payments was perfected.
2 5
Leasing also had a reversionary interest in the equipment. Adopting
the views expressed by Joseph Levie,2 the court reasoned that the
reversionary interest in the equipment was not embodied in the
leases because the reversion is an interest which a lessor retains in
granting a lease. 27 Consequently, FNCB's security interest in the equip-
ment reversion could only be perfected by filing at the situs of the
equipment.28 Since the bank had not filed at the situs in New Jersey,
its unperfected security interest in the equipment was inferior in
priority to the lessor's trustee in bankruptcy, 20 to whom the court
awarded the proceeds of the equipment sale.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
an assignee of a true lease must file against the equipment to perfect
its interest in an equipment reversion. 30 But the court also held that
the stipulation between the parties did not foreclose the "critical"
issue of whether the Leasing-Plastimetrix agreements were true or se-
curity leases. 31 If the agreements were security leases, Leasing had
parted with ownership of the equipment and had then taken back
security interests together with its right to receive rental payments
from Plastimetrix. Since Leasing's security interests in the equipment
would thus have been granted as a part of the leases rather than re-
tained outside them, FNCB's possession of and filing against the leases
would have perfected the bank's interest not only in the rental pay-
ments but also in the equipment.32 The court remanded the case for
a determination of whether the Leasing-Plastimetrix agreements were
true or security leases.3
3
25. 351 F. Supp. at 1393.
26. Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 939-42 (1969).
27. 351 F. Supp. at 1393. Under both real and personal property law, a reversion is an
interest outside the lease. United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d 338, 341-42 (4th Cir. 1957); 1
H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 146(b), at 868 (1912); see genecally
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 154-55 (1936).
28. Professor Robert Charles Clark has summarized the "conceptual basis" for the
court's decision:
The lessor grants a leasehold interest to the lessee; the reversionary rights are
what he has left; the reversionary rights, being left over from what was carved out
by the lease, do not arise "under" the lease; . . . perfecting against the lease and
against the reversionary rights are therefore conceptually separate ....
Clark, supra note 14, at 237-38.
29. § 9-301(l)(b), (3).
30. 486 F.2d at 370-72, also citing Levie, supra note 26, upon which the district
court relied.
31. 486 F.2d at 372. The court noted that the stipulation had been made before
the parties were aware that the true lease-security lease distinction was crucial.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 374. The parties had stipulated that the proceeds of the equipment sale
would be awarded in a lump sum. Accordingly, the district court chose not to conider
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The Second Circuit's approach requires the same actions to perfect
a security interest in rental payments under both true and security
leases: the assignee must possess or file against the lease. However, in
the court's view, the different nature of the true and security lessors'
interests in the underlying equipment requires the assignees of true
and security lessors to take different steps to perfect their security in-
terest in the equipment. The assignee of a security lessor does not
have to take any additional steps beyond perfection against the lease
itself; the assignee of a true lessor must make an additional filing
at the situs of the equipment. Thus, the Leasing Consultants court
imposed a single perfection rule on the assignees of security lessors
and a double perfection rule on assignees of true lessors.
Neither the district court, the court of appeals, nor the litigants
considered the possibility that the Code should be construed to pro-
vide that possession of or filing against a true lease perfects an interest
not only in the rental payments but also in the equipment reversion.
34
All seemed to accept a double perfection rule for true lease assignments
and a single perfection rule for security lease assignments. 35 This Note
contends that both the technical provisions of the Code and its broader
policy and purpose support a single perfection rule regardless of the
label applied to the agreement between lessor and lessee. No filing
whether part of the proceeds represented FNGB's perfected interest in the rental pay-
ments under the leases. 351 F. Supp. at 1394. The Second Circuit intimated that a
part of the proceeds might represent FNCB's interest in the leases, but left the district
court free to keep the fund intact. 486 F.2d at 374.
Since Plastimetrix had defaulted, one would assume that the entire proceeds of the
sale represented the interest in the equipment. The opinions suggest, but do not clearly
articulate, two theories which might justify a partial award to the bank.
(1) In the agreement with Leasing's trustee in bankruptcy under which Plastimetrix
surrendered the equipment, the bank apparently gave up its right to sue Plastimetrix
for unpaid rent in exchange for a partial interest in the sale proceeds. See 351 F.
Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 370.
(2) The bank argued that under the leasing agreements, Plastimetrix had promised
not only to pay rent but also to allow Leasing to repossess and sell the equipment
upon default, and to credit the proceeds of the sale to any unpaid rentals. Therefore,
the bank contended, perfection of a security interest against the lease also perfected
a security interest in the equipment to the extent of any unpaid rentals. The Second
Circuit left this issue open on remand. 486 F.2d at 373-74. This approach is a hybrid
of double and single perfection rules. It is inconsistent both with the Second Circuit's
theory that the entire equipment reversion is retained outside the lease, and with the
Code policy of uniformity which supports the single perfection rule. See pp. 1730-31 infra.
34. FNCB also contended, unsuccessfully, that a reversionary interest in equipment
should be regarded not as "goods" but as "an intangible interest sited at Leasing's domicile
in New York," in which case the bank's New York filings would have perfected its in-
terest in the reversions under § 9-103(2) (1962 version) (now contained, in substantial
part, in § 9-103(3) (1972 version)). 486 F.2d at 371-72. This Note does not consider the
bank's general intangibles argument.
35. Although the district court did not address the perfection issue for security lease
assignments, its general reliance on Levie, who supports a single perfection rule for such
leases, indicates that the court probably would have accepted a single perfection rule if
confronted with the issue. 351 F. Supp. at 1392-93; Levie, supra note 26, at 940-41.
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at the situs of the equipment should be required from the assignee
whether the underlying agreement is a true lease or a security lease.
II. Perfection of Leasehold Assignments Under the Code
The Leasing Consultants double perfection rule is based on the
view that the security lessor "gives up" and then "takes back" an in-
terest in the equipment, while the true lessor "retains" an equipment
reversion outside the lease and therefore must assign it separately from
rights arising under the lease.36 To the extent that this "metaphysical"37
approach has a basis in the Code, it presumably must rely on the
distinction between true and security leases drawn in § 1-201(37). 38
However, nothing in § 1-201(37) suggests that the distinction should
lead to differing treatment of leasehold assignments. In any event,
§ 1-201(37) does not support the notion that a security lessor parts with
title to the equipment and then takes back a security interest. The
second sentence of the section states, "The retention or reservation
of title by a seller of goods ...is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest."39 The security lease is a "title retention device"
whereby the security lessor sells goods but reserves title as collateral
for the lessee's payments.40 Therefore, the security lessor reserves a
security interest just as the true lessor reserves an equipment rever-
sion. If reservation of an interest were the key, a double perfection
rule would also have to be used for assignments of security leases and
other title retention devices such as conditional sales contracts.4
1
The alternative approach is to begin with what Article 9 defines,
in § 9-105(l)(b), as "chattel paper": "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a
lease of specific goods." As Levie noted,4 2 both security leases ("a mone-
tary obligation and a security interest") and true leases ("a monetary
36. See p. 1726 supra.
37. Clark, supra note 14, at 237.
38. Another possible source of authority for a double perfection rule cited by the
Leasing Consultants courts is the Comment to § 9-101 which states that "for some pur-
poses, there are distinctions based on the type of property which constitutes the col-
lateral .... " See 351 F. Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 370. There is no reason to think
that this Comment was meant to approve distinctions between assignments of different
types of leasehold interests. See the excerpts from the same Comment at pp. 1730-31 inIra.
Both true and security leases are Article 9 chattel paper, pp. 1728-29 infra; in Comment 5
to § 9-102 and the tables which follow, chattel paper, not a subdivision thereof, is re-
ferred to as one of the "particular types of collateral" to which "special rules" apply.
39. (Emphasis added.)
40. See 1 GILmOmRE, supra note 7, § 3.2, at 67, § 3.6, at 76-77.
41. See also § 9-202: "Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations
and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."
42. Levie, supra note 26, at 939.
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obligation and . . . a lease") are chattel paper when assigned.43 The
assignee's security interest in chattel paper can be perfected either by
possessing the paper or by filing against it.44 The issue of what per-
fection rule should apply to each type of leasehold assignment becomes
a question of the rights which can be perfected through chattel paper.
A single perfection rule for security lease assignments follows di-
rectly from the chattel paper definition. Security lease-chattel paper
evidences both the obligation of the lessee to make rental payments
to his lessor and the lessor's security interest in the leased goods. Per-
fection by the lessor's assignee of a security interest in the paper per-
fects the assignee's interest in both of the underlying obligations.45
For true lease assignments, the true lessor's right to receive rental
payments from the lessee is once again the § 9-105 "monetary obliga-
tion," but the meaning of "lease" in § 9-105 is not clear. Three alterna-
tives seem possible. First, "lease" could be construed as the rental pay-
ments which the lessee owes to the lessor. Since the rental payments are
already included in the chattel paper by the reference to "monetary
obligation," however, the word "lease" would become redundant to
the extent that it would not add to the interests perfectible through
true-lease chattel paper.46 By contrast, both the "monetary obligation"
and the "security interest" in security lease-chattel paper refer to inter-
ests which are perfectible through the chattel paper. A second interpre-
43. "[M]hether or not the lease itself is a security agreement, it is chattel paper
when transferred if it relates to specific goods." § 9-105, Comment 3.
True leases, security leases, and other security agreements can be termed chattel paper
only when they are assigned. See, e.g., § 9-105, Comment 4:
A dealer sells a tractor to a farmer on conditional sales contract or purchase money
security interest. The conditional sales contract is a "security agreement," the farmer
is the "debtor," the dealer is the "secured party" and the tractor is the type of
"collateral" defined in Section 9-109 as "equipment." But now the dealer transfers
the contract to his bank, either by outright sale or to secure a loan. Since the
conditional sales contract is a security agreement relating to specific equipment,
the conditional sales contract is now the type of collateral called "chattel paper."
In this transaction between the dealer and his bank, the bank is the "secured party,"
the dealer is the "debtor," and the farmer is the "account debtor."
(Emphasis added.) See also § 9-302(2), Comment 7.
If a security lease were chattel paper in the hands of a lessor, the lessor could perfect
an interest against the lessee merely by holding the security lease-chattel paper. See
below. The Code, however, requires a security lessor to file its interest. See pp. 1723-24
supra. Similarly, if the true lessor were deemed to hold chattel paper against the lessee,
the lessor would have to perfect its security interest under the rules governing chattel
paper. But the true lessor does not have to take any action to perfect its interest.
See p. 1725 supra.
44. §§ 9-304(1), -305.
45. Courts and commentators have never questioned the Second Circuit's view that
the Code requires a single perfection rule for security lease assignments. See p. 1726
supra; Clark, supra note 14, at 238-39; Levie, supra note 26, at 940.
46. Under this interpretation, the word "lease" would still serve to include true leases
in chattel paper. See § 9-105, Comment 4. Therefore, it would not strictly speaking be-
come surplusage.
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tation of "lease," as the ancillary obligations between true lessors and
lessees (for example, the obligation of either party to keep the equip-
ment in good repair), would be likewise redundant. The Comment
to § 9-106 makes clear that such obligations are included in the rights
to payment under all types of chattel paper.47
A third chattel paper definition avoids the redundancy problem. The
word "lease" could be construed to mean the equipment reversion-
the right to repossess the equipment on default or expiration of the
lease.48 The "lease" in true lease-chattel paper, like the "security in-
terest" in security lease-chattel paper, would add to the rental payments
another interest perfectible through chattel paper. A single perfection
rule for true lease assignments would then follow; perfection of a se-
curity interest in true lease-chattel paper would perfect an interest
both in the rental payments and in the equipment reversion. 40
The Code does not compel either a single or double perfection
rule for true lease assignments. Since the drafters of the Code did not
specifically work through the true lease assignment problem,", any
argument for a single perfection rule must be indirect and inferen-
tial.51 However, § 1-201(37) does not support the Second Circuit's
theory for double perfection, and the definition of chattel paper seems
to suggest single perfection.
III. The Article 9 Policy of Uniformity
Both the district court and the Second Circuit in Leasing Con-
sultants noted with approval the Comment to § 9-101, which states
the purpose of Article 9:
47. "Whatever perfection is required for the perfection of an assignment of the right
to the payment of money will also carry these ancillary rights."
48. Another approach which avoids the redundancy problem would be to construe
"lease" to mean an interest in the equipment to the extent of any unpaid rentals. How-
ever, this "hybrid" approach should be rejected. See note 33 supra.
49. The perfection of a security interest must be distinguished from its creation by
contract between lessor and assignee; both are needed for a perfected security interest.
The fact that it is possible to perfect a security interest in an equipment reversion
through a true lease does not mean that whenever a lessor assigns a "lease," the lessor
has assigned a security interest in the reversion as well as in the rental payments.
Whether the assignment includes both interests would be a question of contract law.
50. See pp. 1722-23 supra.
51. See also § 9-102(3):
The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured obligation is not
affected by the fact that the obligation is . . . secured by a transaction . . . to
which this Article does not apply.
In other words, Article 9 applies to a "secured obligation" between a lessor and his
assignee whether or not the Code requires the lessor to file against the lessee. 1 GILMORr,
supra note 7, § 10.6, at 312 n.3.
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[T]o provide a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present day secured financing transactions
can go forward with less cost and greater certainty.
The scheme of this Article is to make distinctions, where dis-
tinctions are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines .
2
The policy of uniformity underlying Article 9 requires a clear func-
tional, rather than formal, distinction between assignments of true
and security leases to justify the application of differing perfection
rules.
While Leasing Consultants seems to be the first case in which the
distinction has been raised in a contest between the lessor's trustee in
bankruptcy and the lessor's assignee, the distinction has a long history
in contests between the lessee's trustee in bankruptcy and the lessor.a
3
Courts developed the distinction to preserve the integrity of pre-Code
secured transactions filing statutes. In an effort to avoid the filing
requirements and the related limitations on the rights of creditors,
19th-century lawyers began to put purchase money security transac-
tions in the form of leases, which were not explicitly covered by the
statutes. Courts responded to these attempts at evasion by distinguish-
ing between true leases and those which were merely "disguised" se-
curity agreements, and by holding the latter subject to the filing re-
quirements.5
4
Whatever its current validity, 5 this historical rationale for the dis-
52. 351 F. Supp. at 1392; 486 F.2d at 370. (The courts quoted the first of the two
sentences but not the second.) See also § 9-106, Comment: "[i]t is not the intent of the
Code to split up the rights to the payment of money and its ancillary supports, and
thereby multiply the problem of perfection of assignments."
53. The Leasing Consultants courts cited three cases dealing with the true lease-
security lease distinction. Allen v. Cohen, 310 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1962), cited at 351 F.
Supp. at 1392; In re Telemax Corp., 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Babbit,
Ref.), cited at 486 F.2d at 373; In re Walter Willis, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1971), cited at 486 F.2d at 373. In all three cases, the
part' arguing for the distinction was the lessee's trustee in bankruptcy. See also cases
cited in WinxE & Su.imERs, supra note 8, § 22-3, at 760 n.3 (various third parties suc-
cessfully attacking security lessor's unperfected interest).
54. 1 GILMORE, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 76-77; see Coogan, supra note 5, at 936-38;
Levin, supra note 17, at 135-37. In applying the distinction, courts generally went no
further than necessary to protect the purposes of the filing statutes. For example, long
term leases of equipment commonly known to be on lease, such as shoe machinery and
computers, often contained contract terms similar to those found in security leases.
Nevertheless, courts refused to treat these long term leases as security leases because "no
creditor could rationally claim to have been misled by the presence of an I.B.M. machine
or a telephone on his debtor's premises." I GILMORE, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 79.
55. Both true and security leases are now used primarily to finance the acquisition
of equipment. See Hiller, Security Aspects of Chattel Leases in Bankruptc', 34 FORDHAM
L. REV. 439 (1966); Riordan & Duffy, supra note 6, at 763-64; Weiss & McGugan, supra
note 6, at 3; Comment, supra note 9, at 134-35. The similarity in the economic function
of true and security leases has led some commentators to contend that the distinction
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tinction does not justify different filing requirements for true and se-
curity lease assignees to perfect against the lessor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy.50 The lessor's trustee in bankruptcy represents the lessor's
creditors, whose concern is whether the lessor has already granted an
interest in the lease to a prior secured party. The nature of the un-
derlying lease agreement has no bearing on this concern. The filings
necessary to give adequate notice to the lessor's buyers and creditors
do not depend on the terms of the lease. The distinction may in fact
mislead creditors of the lessor who take a security interest in leased
equipment believing that the agreement is a true lease and relying
on the absence of an equipment filing.57 Indeed, in the very article
which provided the primary authority for the Leasing Consultants
double perfection rule, the author expressed the view that the "dif-
ferences in treatment [of true and security lease assignees] create dis-
tortions in the second level chattel paper transaction without any
rational justification."
5 8
Assuming that the same perfection rule should apply to both true
and security lease assignments, the question becomes which rule to
apply. The double perfection rule imposes additional filing costs on
assignees59 without substantially improving the notice to the buyers
and creditors of the lessor; 60 on balance the single perfection rule
should be abolished. Levie, supra note 26, at 941; Comment, supra note 9, at 136-37;
cf. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 81. But see Coogan, supra note 5, at 960-61. This
Note need not go so far; it contends only that there is no justification for the distinction
at the assignment step.
56. If a security lessor has filed, the Code does not require the assignee to file in
order to perfect against the lessee's trustee in bankruptcy. § 9-302(2).
57. The line between true and security leases is unclear, see Coogan, supra note 5,
at 911; if the agreement were subsequently shown to be a security lease (e.g., by parole
evidence not available to the creditor, see 486 F.2d at 373), the creditor could be de-
feated by a prior assignee of the lessor who had perfected an interest in the equipment
under the single perfection rule applicable to security leases, see § 9-312(5), and possibly
even by- a subsequent assignee. Cf. Clark, Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 463-64 (1975).
58. Levie, supra note 26, at 939.
59. If the lessor, leases and assignee are all in the same state, the costs imposed by
the extra filings against the equipment will be minimal. A greater, but probably not
excessive, inconvenience results if the lessor is operating in several states but has only
one security assignee. In that case, the assignee need make only one general filing in
each state. The leased goods are "inventory" of the lessor and the Code permits per-
fection of security interests in inventory by means of a general filing. § 9-109(4); see,
e.g., In re Varney Wood Prod., 485 F.2d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1972). However, the extra
filings put a heavy burden on the large multistate lessor with a number of security
assignees. A lessor's assignee who was allowed to make a general filing against the lessor's
equipment could later take priority over another assignee who actually received his
security interest before, but only filed after, the first assignee. See § 9-312(5). Since the
possibility of such a result would be unacceptable to subsequent assignees, the lessor
would have to require the filings of each assignee to specify precisely the equipment
covered. As new leases replaced old ones in the assignees' portfolios, the cost of the
filings and refilings and the risk of critical clerical errors would increase.
60. The district court in Leasing Consultants reasoned that the equipment filings re-
quired by a double perfection rule were necessary to protect third party creditors of
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seems preferable.6' As a practical matter, regardless of the perfection
rule adopted, parties dealing with the lessor may continue to file62
and to search 63 at the location of both the lessor64 and the equipment.
It is not necessary, however, to resolve the complexities of double and
single perfection in order to reject the Second Circuit's double per-
fection rule for true lease assignments. Given a Code policy of uni-
formity and an established single perfection rule for security leases, 5
the same rule should apply to true leases.
the lessor. The court cited the possibility that, under a single perfection rule, a judg-
ment creditor might rely on the absence of a filing at the situs of the equipment, and
attach the equipment in which the financing assignee had already perfected a security
interest through the lease. 351 F. Supp. at 1393-94, cited without comment, 486 F.2d
at 371 n.4. If a single perfection rule werel established for true lease assignments, how-
ever, the creditor would not rely upon the absence of an equipment filing, any more
than if the underlying agreements were security leases. The creditor would be aware
of the need to check for a perfected interest in the equipment through the chattel
paper. See Clark, supra note 14, at 238-39.
61. The 1972 version of the Code gives a single perfection rule at least one further
advantage over double perfection. Under a double perfection rule, the party who
searches for other perfected security interests in the equipment will check for filings at
the situs of the equipment (§ 9-102(1); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 23-18, at
847); under a single perfection rule, at the situs of the lease (§ 9-102(1) (1962 version))
or of the chief executive office of the lessor (§ 9-103 (1972 version)). The searching
party must also check to see that the equipment, lease or lessor has not moved from
one state to another within four months. See § 9-103(3). The lessor is less likely to
move its chief executive office than its leased equipment; accordingly, under the 1972
version, the single perfection rule makes for an easier search process than a double
perfection rule. (By the same reasoning, if equipment is moved less frequently than
leases, the 1962 version would make the search easier under double perfection than
single perfection.)
62. This filing is necessary to give the assignee priority in equipment repossessed
by the lessor after default or expiration of the lease. See Clark, supra note 14, at 234
& n.14.
63. A perfected security interest in the equipment granted before the current lease
began would be superior to an interest in the equipment perfected subsequently through
the lease under a single perfection rule. See Clark, supra note 57, at 464. An assignee
who had failed to check for such filings could lose to the prior secured party.
64. Under the 1962 version of the Code, the searching party would check at the
location of the leases, rather than at the lessor's chief executive office. See note 61 supra.
65. P. 1729 supra.
1733
